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Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment
Since 1950 the Supreme Court has passed on the constitutionality
of a wide variety of statutes attaching civil disabilities' to membership
in political organizations, especially the Communist Party. While the
Court has employed a number of constitutional theories in disposing
of these cases,2 one of them-Justice Frankfurter's first amendment
"balancing test" 3-has provided the primary doctrinal underpinning
for most of the decisions.4 But in the latest disability cases, Elfbrandt
I. "Civil disability" as used in this Note refers to the denial of government benefits to
an individual because of his political association. Some disability statutes exclude indi-
viduals on the basis of association and impose criminal sanctions on those who attempt
nonetheless to avail themselves of the benefit denied. Statutes of this kind may of course
be tested in criminal prosecutions. The issue in such cases, however, is generally the con-
stitutionality of the underlying exclusionary practice rather than of the criminal sanction.
Cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
2. Besides the first amendment right of association, which is dealt with in this Note,
the Court has made extensive use of substantive due process (e.g., Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)); and pro-
cedural due process (e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959): Vitarelll v. Seaton, 359
U.S. 535 (1959)) to strike down disabilities. In upholding disability statutes, the Court has
had resort to the right-privilege distinction, e.g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
485 (1952), and to a theory that discharge from employment for refusal to answer questions
about political activity raises no first amendment issues if ostensibly based on "insubordl-
nation" rather than "disloyalty," e.g. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
3. The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in na-
tional security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing
interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too
inflexible for the non-Euclidean problems to be solved ....
. . . The complex issues presented by regulation of speech in public places, by
picketing, and by legislation prohibiting advocacy of crime haive been resolved by
scrutiny of many factors besides the imminence and gravity of the evil threatened.
The matter has been well summarized by a reflective student of the Court's work.
"The truth is that the clear-and-present danger test is an oversimplified judgment
unless it takes account also of a number of other factors: the relative seriousness of
the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political ac-
tivity; the availability of more moderate controls than those which the state has Im-
posed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is launched.
No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger,' . . . it is not
a substitute for the weighing of values .... Freund, On Understanding the Supreme
Court, 27-28.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-525, 542-43 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. Some cases in which the Court has openly balanced the conflicting interests are Gib-
son v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 867 U.S. 1 (1961); Louis(-
ana ex rel. Gremillian v. NAACP, 366 US, 293 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. B6
(1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 188, 191 (1952); American Communication
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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v. Russell (1966),5 Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967),c and United
States v. Robel (1967),7 the Court appears to have abandoned the
balancing test in favor of a more structured process of adjudication.
Although the opinions which mark this change are unusually con-
fused, they suggest that due process notions of civil "punishment" put
forward in dissent during the 1950's by Justices Black and Douglas
have had a strong influence on the Court. Despite its origin, the new
approach can-and should-be justified in first amendment terms.
I.
Elfbrandt, Keyishian, and Robel represent a movement-though
a somewhat erratic one-along the continuum which stretches from an
extremely ad hoc method of decision to one based on per se rules.8 In
the ad hoc model, the Court considers as many of the long and short
run consequences of possible dispositions as it can imagine, attaches
to each the weight which seems appropriate, and, by balancing the
weighted consequences, reaches its decision. From the point of view
of first amendment law, the most important feature of this approach
is that decisions have little value as precedent." While an "all fours"
case is conceivable, the large number of relevant factors virtually en-
sures that every subsequent case will contain enough dissimilar factual
aspects to be easily distinguished.
At the other end of the continuum, the Court singles out a small
number of factors as critical and uses them as the basis of a per se rule.
To decide a case of first impression, the Court may consider the same
wide range of consequences as it would under the ad hoc model, but
the result is announced as a rule of law which is to be invoked when-
ever the critical factors appear. In any subsequent case the Court must
still determine whether the critical aspects are present, but it need
not deal with any of the other myriad factors considered in the case
that originally laid down the rule.10
5. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
6. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
7. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
8. The distinction between ad hoc and per se methods of adjudication developed here
resembles that used in Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Su-
preme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755, 763-64, 773-76 (1963).
9. See note 11 infra.
10. These two models of decision are of course in no way peculiar to the law of the
first amendment. In constitutional adjudication it is common for the Court to move from
a relatively ad hoc model to one based on per se rules as it becomes "case-hardened" in
a particular area. Compare Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). and Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (coerced con-
fessions); compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
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The balancing test approach to first amendment cases is very close
to the ad hoc end of the continuum. The balancing court reserved the
right to treat each case on the basis of the particular circumstances
involved, weighing the importance of various government interests
which were at stake against the severity of the infringement of speech
or association and taking into account the range of alternatives which
were available both to the state and to the citizen." Conversely, the
"classificatory" approach of Justice Black and Professor Emerson 12 is
close to the other end of the continuum. The classifiers insist that in
first amendment cases the Court must answer two distinct questions:
Is the conduct affected "speech"? Is the state action "abridgement"?
Each question must be answered on the basis of a sufficiently small
number of factual aspects so that private actors will be able to predict
whether or not their particular activities are legitimate.'3
11. Given the multiplicity of aspects which may have been important to the result, it
is relatively difficult to predict under balancing whether a particular state action will
be found in a particular case to have been an "abridgement" or a valid "regulation."
Compare NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), with Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); compare Gibson v. Florida Leg
Invest. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), with Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961);
compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), with Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961).
12. The phrase "classificatory approach" describes the method of deciding first ausend-
ment cases elaborated by Professor Emerson. He has summarized it as follows:
[M]aintenance of a system of freedom of expression requires recognition of the dis-
tinction between those forms of conduct which should be classified as "expression" and
those which should be classified as "action;" and that conduct classifiable as "expres-
sion" is entitled to complete protection against government infringement, although
"action" is subject to reasonable and non-discriminatory regulation designed to achieve
a legitimate social objective. The definition of "expression" is a functional one. It Is
based upon the proposition that normally no harm inheres in such conduct itself,
but only from the ensuing "action;" upon the individual and social purposes served
by freedom of expression in a democratic society; and upon the administrative re-
quirements for maintaining an effective system of free expression in actual operation.
Translated into legal doctrine based upon the first amendment, this theory requires
the Court to determine in every case whether the conduct involved is "expression"
and whether it has been infringed by the exercise of governmental authority ...
The function of a court in applying the first amendment is to define the key terms
of that provision-"freedom of speech," "abridge," and "law." The definition of
"abridge" and "law," like the definition of "expression," must be functional in charac-
ter, derived from the basic considerations underlying a system of freedom of expres-
sion.
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 21-22 (1964),
cf. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YAU L.J. 1424, 1437 (1962). See also
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAz. L.J. 877 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Emerson, General Theory].
The "absolutist" position of Justice Black seems to be distinguishable from that of
Professor Emerson only in its rhetorical insistence on the "unequivocal" nature of the
first amendment's guarantee of free speech. Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-71
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134,, 140-53 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting); Emerson, General Theory 914-15; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960); Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 673, 736-44 (1963).
13. The classifiers tend to assert that their approach helps in determining which lines
should be drawn, as well as demonstrating that lines are desirable. On the one hand, they
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Although Justice Frankfurter urged that the Court remain close to
the ad hoc end of the continuum in all first amendment cases,'4 in
fact it has tended to treat criminal prosecutions under the Smith Act 15
in a relatively more classificatory fashion than so-called "indirect" cases
involving municipal ordinances, requirements of political disclosure,
and civil disabilities. 6 In the area of disabilities, the Court has re-
seem to place some confidence in the everyday meanings of the words "speech" and "ac-
tion" as offering a guide to the definition of protected and unprotected activity. Cf.
Emerson, General Theory 917; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L Rrx. 865 (1960).
On the other, they put forward an analysis of the "function" of the first amendment in
the American political system. From this the different functionalists derive their different
ideas of what the first amendment protects. Cf. Emerson, General Theory 878-86: Franz.
The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1449 n.105 (1962); Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245. There is no apparent reason why
a balancing court could not use these two guides to decision in first amendment cases.
However, it seems unlikely that either will be of great usefulness in deciding the close
cases which cause most conflict on the Court. This Note therefore focuses on tie attitude
toward per se rules as the principal issue between balancers and classifiers.
14. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-55 (1951) (concurrence).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). The principal cases are Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States. 341 US.
489 (1951). These were styled "direct" cases, since the Smith Act was overtly designed to
control the content of speech rather than to achieve some other government objecthe by
means which incidentally affected speech. The Court distinguished these cases from the
municipal ordinance, disclosure, and disability cases on the basis of legislative intent,
rather than on the ground that one group involved civil and the other criminal sanctions.
Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
16. The "indirect" cases involving disabilities and disclosure are listed in note 8 supra.
Examples of the municipal ordinance cases are Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US. 77 (1949); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 US. 569 (1941); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
In the Smith Act cases, supra note 15, the Court at least attempted to define mutually
exclusive categories of protected and unprotected speech on the basis of per se rules. In
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the distinction was based on "advocacy in the
realm of ideas," as opposed to "advocacy in the realm of action." In Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), membership "with intent to further the illegal goals of the
organization" was distinguished from membership without intent. By contrast, in the
"indirect" cases the Court tended to avoid laying down any such precise boundaries for
protected conduct. Justice Harlan has described the difference as follows:
One the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has ben
considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. . . . On the other hand,
general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but inci-
dentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law
the first or fourteenth amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they
have been found justified by subordinating valid govermnental interests, a prerequi-
site to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the govern-
mental interest involved.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 US. 36, 50-51 (1961).
It may be objected that a per se rule based on an amorphous mental element such as
intent or an abstraction such as "advocacy of ideas" offers little more certainty than a
completely ad hoc decision. Cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Yet even if the
rule does not affirmatively resolve any given issue, it does eliminate issues fron considera-
tion altogether. Speiser v. Randall, 357 US. 513 (1958), is an example. California denied
a veterans' tax exemption to advocates of violent overthrow and placed on the applicant
the burden of proving non-advocacy. The Court treated the statute as a "direct" restraint
analogous to the Smith Act and held that the sanction could be applied only to "unpro-
tected" activity as defined by Dennis and Yates. From there it ms a relatively easy step to
the conclusion that the burden of proving indulgence in unprotected speech must be on
the state in civil as well as criminal cases. By contrast, in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 US.
36 (1961), the denial of admission to the Bar for failure to answer questions concerning
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cently moved away from balancing and begun to treat "indirect" cases
in a manner previously reserved for "direct" cases.
This process began with the introduction of the concept of "specific
intent to further the illegal goals of the organization" into civil dis-
ability cases. The concept was used in Scales v. United States,1"
a "direct" case which involved a prosecution under the Smith Act, and
was subsequently taken up in Aptheker v. Secretary of State.8 The
issue in Aptheker was whether Congress could forbid any member of
a "communist action organization" to apply for a passport. Justice
Goldberg's majority opinion held this too broad an infringement of
the right to travel, since the prohibition, as applied to many such
members, had no reasonable relation to the asserted purpose of pre-
past membership in the Communist Party was treated as an "indirect" restraint proper
for the balancing test. Although the State had made no affirmative showing whatever of
unprotected activity by the applicant, the denial of admission was upheld on the basis of
a weighing of the seriousness of the infringement against the magnitude of the State In-
terest. Cf. Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between
Justice Harlan and Justice Blach, 21 LAw IN TRANS. Q. 155 (1961).
The distinction between direct and indirect cases has given rise to two different sorts of
confusion. First, the balancing majority of the 1950's and early 1960's differentiated tile
cases on the basis of the legislature's intent to control the content of speech. The classi-
fiers accepted this distinction in principle but claimed that the balancers had misapplied
it. In fact, the classifiers accepted balancing in the municipal ordinance cases, arguing that
these involved non-discriminatory regulations, but rejected it in the disability and dis-
closure cases, on the ground that there the State was attempting to punish unpopular
political views. Compare Adderly v. Florida, 385 US. 39 (1966), with Konisberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56, 68-70 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 134, 141-42 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Frantz, Is the First
Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 786-38 (1963);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 257-58, 261.
The position of the majority of balancers was that disabilities and disclosure requirements
were not intended to have any effect on speech at all, and were therefore "regulations"
causing "incidental" effects like those of the municipal ordinances. E.g., American Coin-
munication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396, 399 (1950); cf. Speiser v. Randall, 857 US.
513, 527 (1958). See generally Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath? 1966
Sup. CT. REv. 193, 202-05. In the disability cases decided after 196-4, the Court seems to
have tacitly accepted Justice Black's view of the matter. See Part II of this Note.
Another sort of confusion is caused by the fact that while a majority of the Court in-
sisted on a "direct/indirect" distinction, it was not at all apparent that the tests applied
in the two sorts of cases were logically different. The initial formulation was that "clear
and present danger" would be retained in direct cases, while indirect cases would be re-
served for "balancing." American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396, 399
(1950). However, in Dennis the Court adopted Learned Hand's formulation of "clear and
present danger" as "the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability," 341 U.S.
494 at 510 (1951). Since this appeared to eliminate the requirement of "imminence" from
the earlier test, it was argued that the Supreme Court "balanced" in both direct and In-
direct cases. Moreover, in Scales-apparently a classic "direct" ease-the Court did not
mention "clear and present danger," giving some credence to the idea that the majority
had accepted Justice Frankfurter's argument for an ad hoc approach to all first amend.
ment cases. Cf. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J 1424, 1427-28
(1962). In fact, a distinction was maintained even in Scales: direct cases were decided in a
relatively more classificatory manner than indirect cases.
17. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
18. 378 US. 500 (1964). The statute in issue was Section 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964). Six justices voted to strike down the statute.
Justices Clark, Harlan, and White dissented.
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serving national security. Members without a specific evil intent com-
posed one of the several groups as to whom the prohibition was not
rational.'9
Aptheker did not announce a first amendment rule of specific intent.
The decision does not purport to go beyond the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case, and the absence of intent was simply one
of those circumstances. In fact, Aptheker, in its extensive listing of
relevant factors, approaches the ad hoc end of the continuum, though
the opinion does not mention the balancing test.2-" Two years later,
however, Elfbrandt v. Russell,21 in the course of holding a state loyalty
oath invalid, gave both Aptheker and the concept of specific intent a
considerably different cast. Justice Douglas writing for the majority in
Elfbrandt flatly stated: "Any lingering doubt that proscription of mere
knowing membership, without any showing of 'specific intent,' would
run afoul of the Constitution was set at rest by our decision in
Aptheker... -. 2 Since the challenged Arizona loyalty oath failed to
focus on specific intent, it was unconstitutionally overbroad.
Justice Douglas did not explain the sudden elevation of specific in-
tent to the status of a constitutional requirement in all disability cases,
and the reasoning of the opinion is so confused that the significance
of the rhetoric is uncertain. 3 In the next disability case, Keyishian v.
19. 378 U.S. at 511-12.
20. Justice Goldberg holds the statute to be overbroad in four ways: the notice pro.
visions are inadequate so that a person who is unaware that his organization has illegal
goals may be convicted; the statute does not distinguish among members according to
"activity" and "commitment," so that inactive members who may not "subscribe un-
qualifiedly" to the Party's goals are as much affected as the activists; the statute fails to
discriminate according to the purpose of travel; and the statute applies to all travel
destinations, regardless of their "security sensitivity." Id. at 509-12. None of these cle-
ments of overbreadth is treated as sufficient in itself to justify invalidation of the statute.
"The broad and enveloping prohibition indiscriminately excludes plainly relevant con-
siderations such as the individual's knowledge, activity, commitment, and purposes in and
places for travel." Id. at 514.
21. 384 U.S. 11 (1966). The Arizona loyalty oath statute in issue in this case was en-
acted in order to render any state employee who took te oath and then "knowingly and
willfully" became a member of the Communist Party or of any other organization having
as one of its purposes the overthrow of the government of Arizona, liable to prosecution
for perjury where the employee had knowledge of the organization's unlawful purpose.
The absence of scjenter, which was important in Aptheker, was thus not a factor in
Elfbrandt. The case was decided by a five to four majority with Justices Clark, Harlan.
Stewart, and White dissenting.
22. 384 U.S. at 16.
23. Elfbrandt contains references to "overbreadth," "dear and present danger," and
"vagueness" as well as to the necessity of showing specific intent. There is also consider-
able confusion as to whether Douglas is attacking the statute for permitting criminal
prosecution for perjury in the absence of a showing of intent or for pennitting discharge
or exclusion from employment without such a showing. Id. at 16-17. For a futile attempt
to make sense of the majority opinion, see Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the
Oath? 1966 Sup. Cr. R v. 193.
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Board of Regents,24 the Court resolved this ambiguity while striking
down a New York law which barred knowing members of the Com-
munist Party from teaching positions. Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion took the view that:
Elf brandt and Aptheker state the governing standard: legislation
which sanctions membership unaccompanied by specific intent to
further the unlawful goals of the organization or which is not ac-
tive membership violates constitutional limitations. 25
In United States v. Robel,26 the most recent of the disability cases,
the Court invalidated a statute barring members of communist-action
organizations from defense employment. Since the statute applied both
to sensitive and non-sensitive positions and did not require scienter, as
well as ignoring specific intent, the highly per se method of Keyishian
was unnecessary. Nonetheless, rather than revert to the ad hoc approach
of Aptheker, the Court chose to state its conclusion in a distinctly
classificatory manner: the statute was overbroad because it sought "to
bar employment both for association which may be proscribed and for
association which may not be proscribed consistently with First Amend-
ment rights. '27
24. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian involved three New York statutes. One made "trea-
sonable or seditious" utterances or acts a cause for dismissal from the public educational
system. A second disqualified advocates of violent overthrow from employment In the
system. The third directed the state Board of Regents to list "subversive" orfanizatlons
and to treat membership in listed organizations as "prima facie evidence" of disqualifica-
tion to be employed in the schools. In a case decided in 1952, the Court had upheld the
last of the three provisions on the ground that the denial of public employment could
not raise first amendment issues because such employment is a "privilege, not a "right."
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). In Keyishian, the Court overturned the
provisions relating to "treasonable and seditious" utterances or acts and the section re-
lating to violent overthrow on grounds of vagueness, following Bagett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964). 385 U.S. 589, 593-604. In the section of the opinion discussed here, the Court
overruled Adler and invalidated the provision by which New York made membership in
subversive organizations prima facie evidence of disqualification to teach. In effect, the law
excluded "subversives" from the schools, since the prima facie case could be rebutted
only by a showing of non-membership in the listed organization, by proof of lack of
knowledge of its subversive nature, or by proof that the organization was not in fact sub-
versive. Id. at 608. The case was decided by a five to four majority with Justices Clark,
Harlan, Stewart, and White dissenting.
25. Id. at 607-08.
26. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The statute in issue was Section 5(a)(l)(D) of the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. § 784(a)(1)(D). Justices White and Harlan dis-
sented; Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision; and Justice Brennan wrote a
separate concurring opinion resting on the argument that the statute delegated to the
Secretary of Defense unconstitutionally broad powers to designate "defense facilities."
27. 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967). The Court in Robel has adopted the "definitional" ap-
proach to first amendment adjudication, and this-though largely a matter of form-is an
important sign of the movement toward a relatively classificatory method of decision. In
the balancing cases, the Court did not hesitate to describe a statute as an "abridgement of
free speech" and then uphold it as constitutional in light of the countervailing interest.
E.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1961) (ma.
jority opinion of Frankfurter, J.); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
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Keyishian and Robel treat the issue of overbreadth in a manner
plainly inconsistent with an ad hoc or balancing approach. In both
cases, the Court objects to the coverage of the statutes, but in neither
case does it attempt to measure the extent of overbreadth by weighing
the first amendment rights infringed by the coverage against the gain
in national security or the purity of the educational process.28 Instead
of evaluating the conflicting claims in the light of the particular cir-
cumstances, the Court takes the requirements of activity and intent as
a "standard," applies it, and summarily finds the statutes overbroad. 29
This conclusion may appear to be undercut because the majority
opinions in Keyishian and Robel also ostensibly rely on the "reasonable
alternative" form of overbreadth, quite apart from finding too inclusive
coverage of individuals. Robel, for example, discussed the possibility
of using criminal penalties for espionage and sabotage and an "indus-
trial security screening program" as alternatives to the statute in
issue.30 For a balancing court, however, "reasonable alternative" anal-
ysis requires examining the legislature's choice of means to judge
whether an alternative would represent a sufficient gain in first amend-
399 (1950). For the classifiers, the statement that a statute "abridges protected speech"
represents the conclusion of the Court's task rather than a step along the way: the form
of the decision is a definition of "speech" and "abridge" which either validates or in-
validates the statute. Emerson, General Theory, 914-15; Frantz, The First dmendment in
the Balance, supra note 12, at 1434-58. This of course tells nothing about how the Court
decided to place the conduct in question in one or the other pigeon-hole. The definitional
approach is however more compatible with per se rules than with an ad hoc method.
since it emphasizes the line-drawing aspect of a decision. The statement that this or that
speech is " protected by the first amendment" makes little sense if tie Court is unwilling
to back it up by offering a rule which allows that speech to be identified in the future.
Thus the adoption of definitional language suggests a movement away from an ad hoc
mode of decision.
28. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In that case, the Court struck dowm a
Virginia statute ostensibly aimed at barratry and champerty but found likely to prevent
NAACP lawyers from developing civil rights litigation. The Court first established that
the language of the statute was broad enough so that the NAACP lawyers might fear its
application to them. The state's "subordinating interest" in regulation of the legal pro-
fession was then considered and found insufficient to justify the loss in first amendment
rights likely to result from the statute. Id. at 444. See also Cole v. Young. 351 US. 536,
546 (1956).
29. In his concurrence in Robel, Justice Brennan expresses concern about this aspect
of the decision. He points out that the statute in Aptleher applied to all communists,
whereas Robel refers only to those who work in defense plants. Thus the restriction in
Robel may be less serious than that in Aptheher. Moreover, the governmental interest
protected by the defense facility statute appears more important to Justice Brennan than
the interest involved in the passport statute. He is therefore "not persuaded" that the
statute is overbroad and goes on to the delegation argument. 389 US. 258, 271-2 (con-
curring opinion). Justice Brennan's approach is that of the classic "balancer," refusing per
se rules in favor of examining each case "in terms of the potential impact upon funda-
mental rights, the importance of the end sought and the necessity for the means adopted."
Id. at 271. What is ironic about Justice Brennan's position is that his majority opinion in
Keyishian goes farther toward setting up a per se rule of specific intent than does the
majority in Robel.
30. 389 U.S. at 267.
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ment freedoms to outweigh whatever loss in efficacy it might entail.,,
Yet the Court in Robel concluded that "[It is not] our function to
determine whether an industrial security screening program exhausts
the possible alternatives to the statute under review"32 and professed
to be concerned "solely with determining whether the statute before
us has exceeded the bounds imposed by the Constitution when First
Amendment rights are at stake."33 In these cases the theory of judicial
weighing which underlies "reasonable alternative" doctrine seems
to have been repudiated. As the Court has restricted its focus to a
small number of aspects of the case-here primarily the presence or
absence of intent-the words "less drastic means" have come to repre-
sent nothing more than the conclusion that the particular means
adopted are illegitimate. Moreover, a final footnote to the majority
opinion makes quite clear that the Court thinks it has an alternative
to balancing:
It has been suggested that this case should be decided by "bal-
ancing" the governmental interests expressed in [the statute]
against the First Amendment rights asserted by the appellee. This
we decline to do.... [W]e have found it necessary to measure the
validity of the means adopted by Congress against both the goal
it has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First
Amendment. But we have in no way "balanced" those respective
interests. 3 4
What the Court has done is withdraw from consideration the large
number of factual aspects important to an ad hoc method of deciding
first amendment cases.35r The question, What is protected "speech"?, is
31. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US. 599, 607-9 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 864 U.S. 479
(1960); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 46-1 (1969). Since
the balancers are particularly concerned with preserving proper judicial deference toward
the judgments of the legislature, the logical requirement that they evaluate alternatives
in making a determination of overbreadth poses a problem for them. A common "solt.
tion" is that adopted by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Robel: "We may assume,
too, that Congress may have been justified in its conclusion that alternatives to [the stat-
ute] were inadequate." 389 U.S. 258 at 271. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-
40 (195i) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For an attack on the failure of the majority opinion
in Robel to provide a candid "balancing" of alternatives, see Gunther, Reflections on
Robel, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140, 1147 (1968).
32. 389 U.S. at 267.
33. Id.
34. 389 U.S. at 268 n.20.
35. The view of the case taken here is directly contrary to that expressed by Professor
Gunther in a recent comment. Gunther, supra note 31. For Professor Gunther, the Court's
disavowal of balancing is explainable only by reference to psychology and politics:
• [P]erhaps some day the Court will be able to assess alternatives, as it does here at
least implicitly, without the compulsion to deny that it is doing so; perhaps some day
it will be able to assess competing ultimate values, as it does here, without denying
that it is doing so-whether the process is called "balancing" or has another label to
which the majority is less allergic. The reluctance is understandable, for unguarded
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to be answered in a relatively classificatory manner by a rule of specific
intent. The cases also imply a change in the treatment of the question,
What is an "abridgement"? After Aptheker, the Court makes no at-
tempt, once the boundaries of protected conduct have been established,
to weigh the seriousness of the disability against the countervailing
governmental interest. In effect, the Court now presumes disabilities
sufficiently serious to be unconstitutional when applied to conduct
defined as "speech," thus treating them in the relatively classificatory
manner once reserved only for "direct" cases of criminal punishment of
speech. 36 As noted above, the requirement of specific intent in disabil-
ity cases is an extension of the rule adopted in Scales v. United States,3-
where the Court read the requirements of intent and activity into the
membership clause of the Smith Act.38
The move away from a resolutely ad hoc method of decision does
not eliminate close cases, or even make them easier to decide. Yet there
are important consequences: the discretionary element in each par-
ticular disability case becomes less apparent, and litigants can predict
with greater certainty how disabilities will be treated. On the other
hand, the Court has sacrificed some of its flexibility in a complex and
sensitive area.39 Perhaps most important, the change suggests that the
avowal carries its own risks, especially of increased institutional vulnerability. But if
the Court is indeed to operate in this arena of conflicting basic interests, as it surely
has done, perhaps there is long-range governmental value in relatively unobscured
acknowledgement of that function.
Id. at 1148. One of the arguments of this Note is that, Professor Gunther notwithstanding.
the Court may quite properly refuse to "assess alternatives" and "competing ultimate
values" in a particular case, if the Court has previously evolved a per se rule (based on the
broadest kind of balancing) which covers that case. See pp. 843-44 supra. For a discussion
of the issue of "institutional vulnerability," see note 40 infra.
36. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
37. 367 US. 203 (1961). The heavy reliance on Scales in Elfbrandt, Keyishian, and
Robel provides a good example of the disintegration of the balancing test in disability
cases. Scales involved the very serious sanction of imprisonment and would therefore be
of little value to a balancing court considering the much less serious sanction of loss of
particular employment. The dissents point out this distinction in Elfbrandt (384 US. at
23, White, J., dissenting) and Robel (389 U.S. at 288, White, J., dissenting) but the ma-jority opinions do not even attempt to answer them.
38. 18 US.C. § 2385 (1964).
39. One branch of the debate over balancing and absolutes has been concerned with
the "legal" virtues of the two tests. The one clear virtue of per se rules is certainty. The
one clear virtue of ad hoc decisions is flexibility. Both sides claim the virtue of "candor,"
perhaps equally unconvincingly. Compare Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CA1F. L. Rxv. 821, 825-26 (1962), with Frantz,
Is the First Amendment Law? 51 CALIF. L. R1v. 729, 746-49 (1963). Both rides also claim
history as an unequivocal ally. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-56
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), with Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amcndment
Mean? 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 461 (1953). As for "rationality," it is clear that both the ad hoc
and the per se approach can be made to meet the minimal fonnal requiresnent that all
the factual aspects important to the decision be stated and that subjective "weight" be
attached to them in a consistent way.
On a more substantive level, it has been argued that unless the Court takes into account
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current majority may no longer accept the concept of the Court as a
frankly political but deferential participant in the process of govern-
ment-a view which underlay the doctrine of "balancing" first amend-
ment rights. It seems likely that the appearance of "principled"
decision-making afforded by classification attracts a number of the
Justices. It is also natural for a Court under intense attack for its
"activist" interpretation of the constitution to seek protection in the
rhetoric of rule-making and rule-application.
40
a very large number of factual aspects of each case--a highly ad hoc method-it cannot
hope to achieve anything approaching intelligent results. Karst, Legislative Facts in Con.
stitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75. On the other hand, there is evidence sug-
gesting that the accumulation of indigestable factual material may cause judges to
abandon rationality altogether. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 295-98 (1960). Opponents of the ad hoc approach
have seen it as particularly undesirable in constitutional adjudication, where the Court
has the function of maintaining a particular historical scheme, as opposed to common
law adjudication, where the judicial function is constantly to adjust "law" to "reality."
Reich, supra note 12, at 737-38. The answer to this is that in a period of burgeoning liti-
gation when constitutional issues-once raised-are brought very rapidly before the Court,
an emphasis on rules creates the danger that the Court will find itself driven in the name
of consistency to extreme applications or the creation of extreme exceptions. Ad hoc treat-
ment, on the other hand, gives maximum play to "experience." For an interesting discus-
sion of this tension, see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 229-35 (1968).
One of the ironies of the debate is that a number of enthusiastic "balancers' have also
been strong advocates of "principled" decision making. Compare Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the Passive Virtues, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964), with Gunther, supra note 31;
compare Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold,
74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 89, 91-94 (1960), with Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark, 8 UrAn L.
REv. 167 (1963). Professor Freund is an exception. P. FREUND, Tn. SuREA E COURT O " Tilt
UNITED STATEs 85-87, 188-90 (1961). On "neutral principles" generally, see Wecchsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 1 (1959); Deutsch,
supra, at 178-229. If "neutral principles" mean anything more than minimal "rationality"
and good faith, then it would appear that they are at the opposite extreme from a reso.
lutely ad hoc weighing of a welter of conflicting interests to produce a one.tinie.only
result.
40. A second branch of the debate over balancing has been concerned with what the
different tests imply about the institutional position of the Court.
For the balancers, it is of paramount importance that the Court preserve its legitimacy
as the final arbiter of constitutional disputes, and they believe this requires that the Court
stay sufficiently within the political mainstream to avoid becoming the object of the sort
of attack which came close to destroying it in the 1930's. The crisis of the Nine Old Men
is seen as the product of an inflated view of the Court's authority to construe tie Consti-
tution independently of national political and economic conditions. When the Court faced
an equally serious political crisis at the beginning of the Cold War, the prescription of the
balancers was to recognize candidly that the Constitution is in no sense a source of a
natural law of free speech and that judicial decisions in all speech cases are very much
analogous to those of the legislature. The consequence of this analysis was the rejection of
rules. Balancing meant restraint in the sense that it deprived the Court of the mystique
of rules of law as a means to defend decisions running counter to the political opinions
expressed by other branches of government. At the same time, balancing meant discretion
in the sense of liberation from precedent as a strong determinant of the result in indi-
vidual cases, and this discretion could be used to keep the Court out of dangerous political
crossfires. Both restraint and discretion were supposed to lead to a relatively passive judi-
ciary, and this was seen as desirable, given the institutional vulnerability of the Court,
an underlying feeling that the political process alone is the ultimate guarantor of the
system of political liberty, and a consequent coolness toward the whole notion of judicial
review.
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II.
The simplest explanation of the shift toward the use of the per se
rule in civil disability cases is the change in the personnel of the
Court.41 Yet unless the new majority is to be dismissed as altogether
disingenuous, the course of reasoning by which it arrived at Keyishian
and Robel is not unimportant. The genesis of the Court's shift lies in
the argument of Justices Black and Douglas-dissenting from decisions
The dassifiers stood this analysis on its head. Like the balancers, they see the Court as
inextricably involved in making political decisions, but they have a higher estimate of its
ability to survive in a hostile climate, perhaps a greater concern that the crisis of the
Cold War endangered the whole system of free expression, and consequently a more
sympathetic attitude toward the notion of judicial review. They prescribe a strengthening
of the legal mystique which comes from laying down rules of law. The consequence of
their approach is seen as the imposition of restraint by the creation of and adherence to
precedent. At the same time they would increase the Court's discretion to disregard the
political consensus as formulated by the legislative and executive branches. They further
argue that the adoption of the defensive posture implied by balancing can only lead to
a weakening of the Court's institutional position, a strengthening of antilibertarian ten-
dencies in the legislature, and therefore an undermining of the Court's capacity to carry
out its function of review. The laying down of rules-no matter what their content-is
regarded as preferable for the maintenance of independent centers of political activity
which balance the power of the legislature and executive. The balancing test, on te other
hand, deters individual dissenters because of uncertainty as to what is permitted, but does
nothing to discourage the state from repeated interference with the political process.
An irony of the balancers' position is that if their theory of ad hoc decision making were
applied literally, it would have the effect of increasing judicial intervention in te politi-
cal process. By insisting on reviewing all the facts which led the legislature to act, the
Court would be imposing its own discretion on that of the other branches. At the same
time, the Court would be denying the citizen any area in which his power of political
expression was unfettered. See Fried, supra note 8. Justice Frankfurter had an answer for
this:
Free speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not legislators,
that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to reconcile competing in-
terests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike is a judgment not
to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless outside te pale of fair judg-
ment.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (concurring opinion). The marked
swing which has occurred during the last fifteen years away from an ad hoc toward
a per se approach (cf. note 10 supra) can be seen as in large part a result of te unwil-
lingness of an activist Court to accept the restrictions implied by Justice Frankfurter's
solution.
Since the two positions rest on divergent premises concerning judicial review, the vul-
nerability of the Court, and the dynamics of the system of political liberty, it seems
unlikely that the debate between balancers and classifiers will ever be resolved. In one
sense, this is desirable. Restraint and discretion, like certainty and flexibility, are each
qualities we require of the judicial process, however irreconcilable they may be in theory.
In the absence of satisfactory general rules which will tell us when to lean to one side
or the other in resolving constitutional issues, it seems best to examine each area of
the law in the light of its particular characteristics. Part III of this Note argues that in
the particular area of civil disabilities a per se method is both feasible and desirable.
For a similar argument applied to the area of compulsion of testimony by legislative in-
vestigating committees, see Note, Legislative Inquiry Into Political Activity: First Amend-
ment Immunity From Committee Interrogation, 65 YALx L.J. 1159 (1956).
41. The majority which decided Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), by balanc-
ing first amendment rights, consisted of Justice Harlan joined by Justices Frankfurter,
Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and
Brennan dissented. In Keyishian the majority consisted of Justice Brennan joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortns. The minority was made
up of Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White.
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in the early 1950's-that civil disability and disclosure statutes were
punitive in intent and effect.42 Neither Justice offered a comprehensive
definition of punishment, and both were less concerned with the
problem of determining legislative intent than with the fact that dis-
abilities and disclosure requirements might be almost as effective
coercive tools as criminal sanctions. Thus, in Barsky v. Board of Re-
gents (1954), 43 Justice Douglas drew the analogy between disabilities
and criminal punishment in terms of their severe impact on the
individual:
If, for the same reason [suspicion of subversive activities, and
membership in suspected subversive organization], New York had
attempted to put Dr. Barsky to death or put him in jail or to take
away his property, there would be a flagrant violation of due
process. I do not understand the reasoning which holds that the
State may not do these things but may nevertheless suspend Dr.
Barsky's power to practice his profession. . . . [I]t does a man
little good to stay alive and free and propertied if he cannot
work.44
While the Court's majority held that the government could impose a
disability on the basis of "reasonable probability" of misbehavior,
45
42. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 878 U.S. 500, 517-18 S196
4 ) (Black, J., concurring;
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 412-17 (1938) (Douglas, 3.9 dlssenting);
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472-74 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wlc-
man v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192-94 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 731-36 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The notion that
disabilities were punishment led the dissenters to develop an elaborate bill of attainder
attack on a variety of statutes. E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, supra. Cf. Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 153-62 (1957); Reich, supra note 11, at 705.08. See
also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Here we are concerned only with the
due process argument based on the analogy between disabilities and criminal punish-
ment. For this argument applied to disclosure requirements, see e.g., Wilkinson v, United
States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (Black, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82-108 (1959) (Brennan J., dissenting).
43. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
44. Id. at 473. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Relief Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 174-83 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
45. The majority view was that the statutes were regulations and as such only had
to be reasonably related to the ends they sought to accomplish. An element of reason-
able relation was a reasonable probability that those affected would misbehave in the
manner feared by the Government. E.g., Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399
(1958); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720-22 (1951). The argument
that the statutes were punitive was met by reference to their regulatory form and by a
refusal to impute sinister intentions to the legislature.
Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter, and
when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it becomes a dui-
bious affair indeed. Moreover, the presumption of constitutionality with which this
enactment, like any other, comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that reading
of the statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save It.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US. 603, 617 (1960).
A second string to the bow of the majority was the "right/privilege" distinction, which
was used on a number of occasions, especially by Justice Clark, to deny that any first
amendment issues at all were raised by state denial of employment or other benefits.
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the analogy to criminal punishment led the dissenters to assert that
both an "act" and some "mental element" must be present before the
sanction could apply. To infer "guilt" and permit "punishment" on
the basis of less was a violation of due process.40 Justice Black had
expressed this idea as early as his dissent in American Communication
Ass'n v. Douds:
[P]enalties should be imposed only for a person's own conduct,
not.., for the conduct of others with whom he may associate.
Guilt should not be imputed solely from association or affiliation
with political parties or any other organization, however much
we abhor the ideas which they advocate.47
The drawing of the impermissible inference came to be called "guilt
by association," especially in the opinions of Justice Douglas, who
fully exploited the emotive quality of the phrase.48
For the minority, then, the question became: What conduct would
support a finding of "guilt" sufficient to justify the imposition of a
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US. 442, 451 (1954); Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952). By the early 1960's, this approach appeared to have been quite
decisively rejected by the Court's new majority. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (and cases cited therein); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US. 398, 404(1963).
46. It has long been true that what is ostensibly a civil regulation may be held by
the Court to be a punishment and therefore invalid unless accompanied by procedural
safeguards approximating those of criminal due process. E.g., Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S.
557 (1922) (tax under National Prohibition Act held unconstitutional). Along with the
argument that the disability and disclosure statutes of the 1950's denied due process by
omitting mens tea, the dissenters argued that as punishment the restrictions could not
be imposed without more than the usual safeguards of administrative procedure. Uphaus
v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 83-108 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Barsky v. Board of
Regents, 347 US. 442, 472-74 (1954) (Douglas, J. dissenting); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Relief Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174-83 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring). Without
going so far as to accept the characterization of the statutes as punishment, a majority
of the Court did on occasion accept a due process argument that the severity of the
sanction made it necessary that particular care be given to procedural fairness. See
Greene v. McElroy, 360 US. 474 (1959); Peters v. Hobby, 349 US. 331 (1955).
Justice Brennan combined the notion of a special due process for "civil punishment"
with the notion of a preferred position for first amendment freedoms to produce an
odd first amendment due process. The theory seems to be that where a civil or criminal
statute has the effect of "punishing" conduct closely related to and difficult to distinguish
from protected speech, the normal rules of due process may be found inadequate on
first amendment grounds. Speiser v. Randall. 347 US. 513, 524-26 (1958). Cf. Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Friedman, Mr. Justice Breznan: The First Decade, 80
HA v. L. Rv. 7, 16-22 (1966). The holding in Speiser--that a civil disability might be
punitive and therefore invalid without special due process safeguards-was picked up in
Elfbrandt as a justification of the rule of specific intent, but was not pursued in Key-
ishian or Robel.
47. 339 U.S. 382, 452 (1950). The theory that the imputation of inens rea purely on
the basis of organizational affiliation violates due process seems to have appeared for the
first time in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136, 146-54 (1943), in which
the Court refused to impute to the defendant in a denaturalization proceeding te views
of the Communist Party on the use of violence as a political weapon.
48. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 262-64 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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disability? Justice Black supplied a partial answer in his majority
opinion in Schware v. Board of Examiners (1957).4 9 There he held that
inferring lack of good character from past knowing membership in
the Communist Party-absent a showing of any intent to further the
illegal goals of the Party-denied an applicant for admission to the
state bar due process of law. 0 While Schware and the earlier dissents
made intent significant only from the perspective of due process, the
notion became commingled with first amendment theory in Scales v.
United States (1961).r' Scales involved a challenge to a criminal prose-
cution under the section of the Smith Act52 which outlawed member-
ship in an organization advocating violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, saw the problem as one
of distinguishing associational activity which constitutionally could be
criminally punished from associational activity which could not. Be-
cause criminal punishment was at issue, the line drawn had to satisfy
the standards of criminal due process as well as the first amendment.
Justice Harlan's solution was to limit the application of the statute
to active members with specific intent to further the Party's illegal
goals. This requirement satisfied the due process clause by providing
an act and mens rea sufficient to support personal guilt.53 At the same
time, the Court held that punishing association without intent pro,
duced an inhibiting effect on first amendment freedoms that out-
weighed the government interest in so dealing with the "substantive
evils which Congress has a right to prevent."54 On its first amendment
side, then, Scales lays down a per se rule of specific intent arrived at by
balancing conflicting interests, but limited narrowly to criminal cases.
As though to emphasize the ad hoc aspect of the decision, on the same
day that it handed down Scales the Court decided that the McCarran
Act55 could constitutionally compel all Communists to register, regard-
less of their activity or specific intent50
Aptheker, Elfbrandt, Keyishian, and Robel seem to have mixed up
the result in Scales with the due process arguments of Justices Black
and Douglas. What is largely fifth amendment reasoning suddetily
comes forward as first amendment theory. Each of the four cases os-
49. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
50. Id. at 247.
51. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The case was decided by a five to four majority. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, dhd brennan dissented.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2885 (1964).
53. 867 U.S. at 244-28.
54. Id. at 229 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1910)).
55. 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1964).
56. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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tensibly applies first amendment criteria, but the language of the
opinions suggests that the Court's real concern is with the punishment
of innocent persons by the imposition of civil disabilities. In Aptheer,
for example, the denial of passports to Party members who are inactive
or lack intent is thought to raise
the danger of punishing a member of a communist organization
for "his adherence to lawfully and constitutionally protected pur-
poses, because of other and constitutionally unprotected purposes
which he does not necessarily share." Noto v. United States...
Scales v. United States.... 7
Similarly, Douglas describes the statute in Elfbrandt as imposing "guilt
by association," citing Schware, which was of course a due process
case.51 Justice White in dissent toys with the idea that Douglas has
voided the statute because the disability is "punishment," and there-
fore cannot be imposed without observing the forms of criminal due
process; but he finally rejects this interpretation because it would
imply that the Court has overruled sub silentlo a number of earlier
decisions holding disabilities not punitive. 9
In Keyishian, Justice Brennan refers to "guilt by association" and
rejects the notion that intent can be inferred from association alone.
He draws the parallel with the earlier due process cases explicitly:
Thus mere Party membership, even with knowledge of the Party's
unlawful goals, cannot suffice to justify criminal punishment, see
Scales v. United States... nor may it warrant a finding of moral
unfitness justifying disbarment. Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners .... 0
57. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The Court also describes the
statute as establishing a "conclusive presumption that individuals who are members of
the specified organizations will, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to the
security of the United States." Id. at 311. The Court cites Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), and Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 US. 232 (1967), both
due process cases, in support of the proposition that it is unreasonable to make such a
presumption. In dissent, Justice Clark points out that if the statute is a regulation to be
evaluated in terms of its reasonableness, then there is a vast amount of authority to the
effect that the exclusion of all members of the dangerous group is permissible, and that
a showing that each individual affected is likely to misbehave is unnecessary. Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 527-28 (1964).
58. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966). Douglas also objects to the statute
for imposing a "conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of
the organization." Cf. note 57 supra. The argument is bolstered by citation of Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which involved a hybrid due process-first amendment
theory and was premised on the punitive nature of the disability statute. Sec note 46
supra.
59. 357 U.S. at 19-20.
60. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967). Justice Brennan also cites
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.. 118 (1943), a due process case, for the proposi-
tion that "beliefs are personal" and that adherence to an organization's purposes can-
not be inferred from mere membership. 385 U.S. at 607.
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This due process rationale is equally present in Robel, where the
Chief Justice's majority opinion charges that the statute "casts its net
across a broad range of associational activities, indiscriminately trap-
ping membership which can be constitutionally punished . . . [citing
Scales] and membership which cannot be so proscribed... [citing Elf.
brandt]."61
Yet in spite of the almost exclusive emphasis on fair imputation of
intent to further illegal ends in association cases, the Court seems
determined to base its decisions on the first rather than the fifth
amendment. Keyishian purports to rest squarely on the first amend-
ment, despite a fully developed fifth amendment theory of specific
intent offered in the brief for the accused, 2 and due process is not
even mentioned in Robel. In fact, the Supreme Court seems no closer
to adopting a formal theory of "punishment" due process in first
amendment situations than it was in the 1950's, even though a majority
now shares the underlying assumptions of such a theory.
One good reason for the hesitation to rely on the fifth amendment
may be the dubious results of attempts in earlier cases
3 to define
punishment for due process purposes. Presumably, if the Court adopted
the approach of Justices Black and Douglas, it would have to determine
whether the disability was "punitive" or "regulatory" in nature before
it could logically invoke the rule of specific intent. Robel and its three
precursors avoid any of the long and detailed assessment of legislative
intent necessary to resolve this issue. Rather than enter this morass,
the Court has chosen simply to characterize the disability statutes as
"punishment," "proscription," or "sanction" and apply the per se rule
requiring specific intent.
A second problem with the fifth amendment approach is that the
due process clause has mainly functioned to protect property interests
while other, more specific amendments have generally protected per-
sonal liberties against state invasions. A holding that fairness requires
61. United States v. Robel, 389 US. 258, 265-66 (1967). The Government's denial that
the statute involved punishment is briefly and unconvincingly disposed of in a footnote:
The Government has insisted that Congress, in enacting § 5(a)(D), has not sought
"to punish membership in 'Communist-action . . .organizations." . . . Rather, the
Government asserts, Congress has simply sought to regulate access to employment In
defense facilities. But it is clear the employment disability is imposed only because
of such membership.
Id. at 265 n.13.
62. Brief for Appellants at 79-87, id.
63. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). See generally Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach
to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 355 n.140 (1962).
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specific intent before sanctions can be imposed on association would
also mean that this rule of intent applies in the area of business
regulation. For example, if the government cannot compel Robel to
forfeit his job without showing that he is "guilty" of something more
than Communist Party membership, it is hard to see how the Securities
and Exchange Commission can bar all employees of stock brokerages
(including janitors) from employment with national banks."
This is not to say that due process notions have no place in first
amendment cases. Strict rules for imputing intent are appropriate
whenever the State threatens to impose severe sanctions on behavior.
However, if the rules governing the application of such sanctions in
disability cases are to be more restrictive than those required by due
process in cases not involving speech, they must be justified in terms of
first and not fifth amendment theory.
III.
Looked at in first amendment terms, Robel and Keyishian pose two
problems: first, they blithely assume what earlier decisions denied,
that all civil disabilities are abridgments merely because they have
an inhibitory effect. Second, they draw the line between protected and
unprotected association on the basis of specific intent without any
explanation more revealing than a cite to Scales.
On the basis of factors which the Court has recognized in its
opinions-and quite independently of the analogy to criminal punish-
ment--disabilities can sensibly be treated as abridging free association
when they attach to certain kinds of political activity. 5 Disabilities of
widely different sorts are much the same in their effect on speech and
association. First, those engaged in the disfavored activity must choose
between some otherwise available benefit and their political associa-
tions. Second, others who might have engaged in the affected association
hesitate to do so.66 Third, given the latitude and uncertainty of the
fact-finding process in first amendment cases, even those not intending
64. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947). Cf. United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 464-72 (1965) (White, J., dissenting) (and cases cited therein). But see id. at 453-5(majority opinion).
65. For an attempt to construct a similar rationale for a per se rule in the area of
legislative investigations, see Comment, Legislative Inquiry Into Political Activity: First
Amendment Immunity from Committee Interrogation, 65 YALE LJ. 1159 (1956). Cf. Emer-
son, General Theory, 942-43.
66. These two aspects of disabilities bring them within the area of "unconstitutional
condition" analysis. Cf. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right.Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439, 1445-51 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Con.
ditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
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to engage in association covered by the statute must "steer far wider
of the unlawful zone" than they otherwise would.0 7 While a single
disability may be relatively innocuous, a number of them cumulated
on particular conduct can serve as a highly effective disincentive. In
an organized, bureaucratic society where everyone depends to some
degree on government benefits, systematic deprivation of privileges
may indeed be the functional equivalent of criminal punishment.
When widespread publicity and denunciation accompany the impo-
sition of disabilities, the result may be public disgrace and ostracism
having a far greater deterrent effect on speech than would the depriva-
tion of benefits alone.68
Moreover, as means to objectives other than the inhibition of po-
litical association, disabilities seem to be ineffective. State and defense
secrets must in any case have the protection of elaborate screening
programs in which organizational affiliation is only one of many factors
considered. Where the state interest is in the competence and diligence
of its employees-and especially teachers-the argument for disabilities
is weaker still, since obtaining good people is as important as excluding
bad ones. A single instance of misbehavior is unlikely to have cat-
astrophic results, and normal disciplinary practices, including firing,
should be adequate to deal with offenders. On the other hand, the
restrictions on associational activity may eliminate badly needed appli-
cants, qualified in every other way, who have in fact no intention to
misbehave.
Since cases in which civil disabilities have an important regulatory
purpose are likely to be rare, the creation of a per se rule against
disabilities attached to protected associational conduct becomes de-
sirable from the standpoint of certainty. When the extent to which
the state may penalize protected association is unclear, those who
engage or might engage in unpopular activities will be discouraged by
the possibility of sanctions. 69 At the same time, given the wide variety
of disabilities and the many kinds of association to which they might
apply, an ad hoc mode of decision could degenerate into a guessing
game in which legislatures experiment until they find a formula ac-
ceptable to the Court.
Perhaps the strongest argument against a per se rule is Justice
Frankfurter's warning that
67. Speiser v. Randall, 357 US. 513, 526 (1958). Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 61, at 1451-
54.
68. E.g., Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 417-25 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (majority opinion).
69. Cf. Comment, Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity, supra note 60, at 1179.80.
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[a]bsolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and
such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands
of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in
national security are better served by candid and informed weigh-
ing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-
Euclidean problems to be solved. 0
One exception to the rule against disabilities, for example, might be
the Hatch Act,71 which bars federal employees from active participation
in political campaigns. Elfbrandt, Keyishian, and Robel, however, have
already seriously weakened the authority of United Public Worhers v.
Mitchell,"2 which determined by semiovert balancing that the Hatch
Act was constitutional. If the holdings of those cases have now crystal-
lized in a per se rule, it is hard to see how Mitchell can stand. Active
Republicans without intent to subvert the federal bureaucracy for
partisan purposes are not likely to pose a more serious problem than
active Communists without intent to overthrow the government. 3
The matter of classified information presents a stronger case for an
exception. An unchallenged section of the McCarran Act 4 makes it
a crime for a member of a "communist organization" to receive clas-
sified material, apparently on the reasoning that the statute will deter
Communists with intent to misuse the information by exposing them
to the risk of conviction even where the government cannot prove
any misuse occurred or was attempted. Such a provision must be
evaluated in the light of the effectiveness of existing laws against
espionage and sabotage,75 and of administrative screening and security
programs. It is possible that the only effect of the law has been to
stigmatize the Communist Party.76 Yet even if the Court upheld the
measure, it is by no means clear that the "exception would eventually
corrode the rule." A method of decision close to the per se end of the
continuum need not aim at rules which are "absolute" in the sense of
having unlimited applicability.77 Where the government interest is
of truly unusual magnitude and the effect on speech close to the de
minimis level, the Court can admit an exception without in any way
undermining the rule.
70. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
71. 18 US.C. §§ 7324, 7525 (1964).
72. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
73. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 170 (1967).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 783(c) (1964).
75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-98 (1964) (espionage); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-56 1964) (sabotage).
76. Apparently no prosecutions have been brought under 50 U.S.C. § 8783(c) (1964).
77. Some dispute exists as to whether it is meaningful at all to speak of such prin.
ciples. Cf. Deutsch, supra note 39, at 178-97.
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The wisdom of the Court's use of specific intent to draw the line
between protected and unprotected association is difficult to assess.
Essentially, the Court is asserting that organizations with both legal
and illegal goals have active members, even leaders, who do not adhere
to the unlawful part of the program. Arguably, it is not only unfair
but also impolitic to treat such members as being equally dangerous
as members who have illegal aims. Given the tendency of radical
organizations in America to assimilate themselves to the democratic
process,78 the interest in orderly change may be best served by en-
couraging rather than discouraging the more moderate members of
groups with both legal and illegal aims. The rule of specific intent
may, however, make it difficult for legislatures to use civil disabilities
at all. Statutes aimed at "active membership with intent" may still be
passed, but to enforce them the state will have to go through all the
procedures presently required for a Smith Act conviction, with the
burden of proving the crucial mental element on the government.
While from the prosecutor's point of view the rule of intent may
seem to draw the bounds of protected association too broadly, it is
a line that provides little guidance to those engaged in political ac-
tivity. Both "intent" and "illegal goals" are ill-defined concepts at
best. Even with intensive appellate review of findings of fact, no intel-
ligible standard for either has emerged from the criminal cases
following Scales;79 there is no reason to expect that the courts will do
any better in civil disability decisions. If the principal requirement of
first amendment doctrine is that it give political activists a clear idea
of what is and is not permitted, the rule is inadequate.
A final objection to the rule is that in some cases it would afford
too little protection to speech. Commentators on Scales have argued
that mere association-with or without intent-is "speech," not "ac-
tion," and therefore protected by the first amendment:
To make proof of knowledge and intent, shown to the satisfaction
of a jury, a sufficient link with illegal action to sustain the criminal
penalty, does not draw the line with the necessary precision and
does not, realistically or effectively, prevent impairment of "legiti-
mate political expression." Under the circumstances, only a re-
quirement of actual participation in the illegal action would serve
to separate action and expression in a manner consistent with the
maintenance of free expression.
8 0
78. Cf. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF TtlE OLIGARCHIIC
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Glencoe ed. 1949).
79. E.g., Noto v. United States, 367 US. 290 (1961).
80. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1,
34 (1964).
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If this argument is accepted with respect to criminal punishment, one
finds it hard to reject in the case of disabilities.
While a rule of specific intent has disadvantages, the alternatives
are even less desirable. To permit imposition of disabilities on bare
membership is both inequitable and dangerous for the political
process. On the other hand, to forbid imposition of disabilities on
any form of membership would be inconsistent with Scales: it makes
no sense to protect conduct against a relatively minor sanction when it
can be criminally punished. Furthermore, if tie Court is indeed
moving toward a classificatory approach to the first amendment, the
adoption of a rule of intent is virtually compelled. The essence of
classification is the attempt to define an area of "protected" conduct
which may be engaged in without fear of governmental interference
of any kind. In order for such an area to exist, it must be defined
independently of particular forms of "abridgement," that is, in terms
of general rules applicable whether the abridging action is civil or
criminal. The requirement that there be a single definition of pro-
tected association posed a problem for a classificatory treatment of
disabilities. One solution would have been to disregard Scales and de-
velop a new rule applicable to both kinds of sanctions. The more
sensible course was the one adopted: Scales is preserved and its rule
extended to cover civil disabilities as well as criminal punishment.
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